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Contact to corresponding author: yuriy_bilan@yahoo.co.uk; Tomas Bata University in Zlín, Faculty of Management and Economics, Mostní 5139, 760 01 Zlín, Czech Republic

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Yuriy Bilan


Tomas Bata University in Zlín, Czech Republic

 orcid.org/0000-0003-0268-009X

Bruno S. Sergi

University of Messina, Italy


Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies Harvard University, United States

 orcid.org/0000-0002-5050-5651

Mihaela Simionescu

University of Social Sciences, Poland

Institute for Economic Forecasting of the Romanian Academy, Romania

 orcid.org/0000-0002-6124-2172

Migration expectations and geography of post-Soviet Ukraine

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Abstract

Research background: Starting from the concept of "post-colonial cultural dependence" and its significance for the contemporary Ukrainian society, imaginary geography is analyzed by describing the representations of the characteristics of countries, regions, places, and people living in these territories. Imaginary geography as a cultural structure implies material consequences. In the context of this paper, it is necessary to provide representations of potential migrants about the characteristics of the host countries, including details about population and the real economic, social and political opportunities after migration. The association between imaginary geography and migration in the expectations of postcolonial cultural dependence has been hardly analyzed before.

Purpose of the article: The purpose of this paper is to analyze the effect of post-Soviet cultural dependence on migration expectations of the Ukrainian population from the postcolonial study perspective.

Methods: The methodology is composed by two elements: a synthesis of neo-institutionalism and social constructivism. The paper hypothesizes that macro and meso level discourses in the emigration environment might have an impact on aspirations through perceptions of “migratory imaginations” and “geographical imaginations”.

Findings & Value added: Findings are based on the cross-national study on external migration conducted within the EUImagine project. The findings show a strong correlation between migration expectations and perceptions of Ukrainians and post-Soviet cultural dependencies. In addition, the country represents a “post-imperial borderland” that results in the political split of the Ukrainian society. Our results might contribute to the establishment of connections between the imaginary geography of the Central, Western, and Southeastern regions of Ukraine and their migration expectations and orientations..

Introduction

Dramatic and bloody confrontations in Kiev and other parts of Ukraine that began in the winter of 2013–2014 have divided the Ukrainian political society, providing evidence of the new round of the Cold War. This has put Ukraine on the brink of losing its territorial integrity and escalated into a full-scale military conflict involving third forces, with turmoil occurring at different levels of socio-political spheres of the society and acquiring peculiar manifestations and new shades. The clash of the ethnocentric model of Ukrainian identity with the ethno-indifferent or civil mode, and many other aspects should be taken into account for recreating a comprehensive analysis of the situation in Ukraine (see e.g. Markov *et al.*, 2009; Strielkowski & Weyskrabova, 2014).

The geopolitical, civilization dimension of the problem has been widely discussed in political and media discourse since the conflict began, with the formal basis of the refusal of the European integration policy by the Ukrainian government (headed by President Viktor Yanukovich) in favor of integration in the post-Soviet space.

Even though the recent history of Ukraine is abundant with examples that confirm the verdict of Huntington and Jervis, who once stated that Ukraine belonged to the so-called “torn countries” with its territory lying on the boundary between different ranges of civilization (i.e., Ukraine split between “Western” and “Orthodox” worlds), often these synthetic formations appear as a voluntary result of establishing political boundaries after a military conflict or after a relatively peaceful distribution of spheres of influence between powerful political actors.

It becomes apparent that “sewing up” an inhomogeneous civilization and political entity is a manageable, although not a trivial task. During the

Soviet period, mechanisms of smoothing differences as mass distribution of graduates to work in distant places of the "vast homeland" were effective, but no longer in existence. Surely, solutions to these problems require a wise policy of social engineering, as well as vast internal and external resources. However, when it comes to external resources, one can notice the absence of external forces that enable the centrifugal processes in the so-called "torn societies".

The objective of this paper is to check if "post-imperial or postcolonial cultural dependency" is relevant to the explanation of the features of imaginary geographies and migration expectations of the Ukrainian population, in particular, in its various regions. We will focus on the description of how such a feature of the mass consciousness of the population of modern Ukraine fits into the overall picture of the socio-cultural differences on the "post-imperial borderland".

The methods consist in a synthesis of neo-institutionalism and social constructivism. The emigration environment is described by the economic, social, cultural, and political context and by the nature of migration as a socially and culturally constructed project. We start from the assumption that the macro and meso level discourses in the emigration environment influence aspirations in an indirect way through perceptions of "migratory imaginations" and "geographical imaginations". In the conceptual model, perceptions of migratory and geographical imaginations contribute to the shaping migratory aspirations.

After this introduction, the paper presents the state-of-the-art in this field. For the Ukrainian society, the assumption about the connection between the nature of post-colonial society and the state was previously analyzed in the early 1990s. Previous studies noticed the systemic nature of the phenomenon of post-imperial dependence. The next section describes the conceptual framework, highlighting the importance of "post-colonial cultural dependence". Data and methods are presented in the next part. The empirical data are provided by the EUMACHINE project. According to the chosen methodology, the migration environment is essential in decision-making. The results indicated that in the context of discourse of the post-imperial, for Ukraine a deeper and more relevant connection had been established with the former metropolis. The last part of the paper concludes that there is a correlation between the expectations and perceptions of migration in the case of Ukrainian people and post-imperial cultural population dependencies for various macro-regions of Ukraine.

State-of-the-art

In the case of Ukraine, there were external forces that stimulated the worsening of significant and contentious differences and splits. Civilization habitats have their own structure — and parts of Ukraine belong to the peripheral areas of the former imperial and quasi-imperial formations. Wave-like dynamics of integration and disintegration of the political space inevitably lead to weakening of the macro-periods — and at such times, the peripheral areas get a relative political autonomy and even independence — but rarely, socio-cultural self-reference.

From this point of view, the Ukrainian society faces a problem of choice between two extremely attractive civilizational cores. Huntington and Jervis conjecture reads: *"according to the civilizational approach, the most likely is the possibility of the collapse of Ukraine. The gap that might be predicted is more violent than in Czechoslovakia, but also less bloody than in Yugoslavia"* (Huntington & Jervis, 1997). Huntington's interpretation is a simplification of a complex social reality of the civilization borderland of Ukraine. The gap probably exists on multiple lines of "cross linking", because talking about localized civilization ranges in the space between the border of the "Western" and "Orthodox" would be a schematization complexity of the political and socio-cultural process in Ukraine. An in-depth analysis of the latent structure of sociocultural communities of the population of Ukraine reveals "not two, but twenty-two" Ukraines (see Hrytsak, 2004). Following the Institute of Sociology of National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine's long-term trend research "Sociological monitoring", as well as analyzing the results of two rounds of the presidential elections of 1994, 1999, 2004 and the results of the parliamentary elections in 1998, 2002 and 2006, we consider five significantly different macro-regions:

1. Donbass and Crimea (including Donetsk and Lugansk region in this type, Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol);
2. The other south-eastern region (the region includes Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhya, Mykolayiv, Odessa, Kharkiv and Kherson regions);
3. The transition region (Zhytomyr, Kirovohrad, Poltava, Sumy and Chernihiv regions);
4. Central Ukraine (Kiyv, Vinnytsia, Cherkasy, Khmelnytsky, and the Kiev region);
5. Western Ukraine (Volyn, Transcarpathian (Zakarpattia), Ivano-Frankivsk, Lviv, Rivne, Ternopil, and Chernivtsi regions) (Vishniak and others 2009)¹.

¹ The five macro-regions of Ukraine were identified by cluster analysis on the basis of

Thus, one can say less about a clearly defined boundary, but more about the gradient of sociocultural, socio-political and geo-political loyalties, identities and orientations (see Figure 1). The concept of imperial cultural dependence is used in the same perspective as the concept of *longue durée*. This approach means the researcher's focus on so-called long-term structures, not individual events. In this sense, analog school representatives opposed the so-called *histoire événementielle* to long story structures concerning permanent or slowly evolving structures. From this perspective, the imperial cultural dependence is a "value-behavioral matrix" replayed by socio-cultural mechanisms, *la longue durée* that defines the capabilities and limitations of societies that have long been in the socio-cultural, political, economic and institutional empires space. According to one of the most influential intellectuals of our time, E. Said, despite the fact that the "age of empires" mainly ended after World War II, when most of the colonies got independence, imperialism continues to influence, mostly culturally (Said, 1994).

Long-term experience of the societies belonging to empires has formed a special value orientation of the population, the idea of personal autonomy, identity and specific repertoire of social and political activities. In addition to the cultural dimension, institutional dimension is extremely important, because, as noted by Kalevi Holsti, political institutions not designed to function in a democratic regime (Kutsenko & Horbacyk, 2014).

In the case of Ukrainian society studies, the thesis about the nature of post-colonial society and the state was noticed by Grabovych and later publicists Riabchuk and Zabuzhko in the early 1990s. In sociological discourse, Kutsenko and Gorbachyk, based on empirical data of cross-national studies, first addressed this subject.

In terms of mass consciousness, researchers emphasize the systemic nature of the phenomenon of post-imperial dependence. According to Riabchuk, it is appropriate to refer to a "post-colonial syndrome," which consists of loyalty to the former imperial power centers and related identity; misunderstanding of belonging to a particular political community and, therefore, a low level of loyalty to the nation-state; negative self-image, i.e. feeling of inadequacy, inferiority, passivity and resistance to innovation; low levels of generalized and institutional trust; low sense of personal subjectivity, etc. The complex of these deformations of consciousness is typical for the so-called Soviet person — *homo sovieticus* (Zarembo, 2015; Simionescu, 2016).

two rounds of presidential elections in 1994, 1999 and 2004 and parliamentary elections in 1998, 2002 and 2006 in the national constituency (three indicators) by candidates and parties of national-democratic, pro-Russian and uncertain identification (Vyshnyak *et. al.*, 2009).

The above-mentioned macro-regions of Ukraine represent a kind of gradient in the range of post-imperial manifestations of cultural dependence, which are clearly manifested, in particular in the rates as a percentage of the voting for the Party of regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine (political forces with a clear geopolitical orientation to the former "Metropolis"). Figure 1 presents the cultural opposition and contradictions of social expectations in East and West Ukraine.

We will check if the concept of "post-imperial or postcolonial cultural dependency" is relevant to the explanation of the features of imaginary geographies and migration expectations of the Ukrainian population, in particular, in its various regions. Migration is of a special relevance in the case of Ukraine. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the process of transformation and the overall orientation to the West triggered off East-West migration movement from Ukraine. The Ukrainian migration is typically circular (i.e. with the intention to return back regularly or for good) and about 80% of emigrants intend to return to Ukraine, maintain close ties with their families and friends, visit Ukraine very often, and invest their earnings in Ukraine (Malynovska, 2008).

We also focus on understanding how such a feature of the mass consciousness of the population of modern Ukraine fits into the overall picture of the socio-cultural differences on the "post-imperial borderland" and resonates with the current political split in Ukrainian society. That is, the central issue of this study is the question of the significance of the "post-imperial factor", manifestations of postcolonial cultural dependency in the imaginary geographies of migration and expectations of the Ukrainian population living in different macro-regions of the country undergoing different civilizational efforts.

Conceptual framework

A definition of the concept of "empire" will be provided anticipating charges for inappropriateness of using the term, and along with it all the outlined perspectives. According to the etymology and the usage of the term in political discourse, "empire" means "a strong state, which is controlled from the center"². For the subject of our study an important topic is establishing mechanisms of imperial influence and imperial political structure.

² Empire is one of the forms of organization of political power and social construction of (heterogeneous in ethnic, social and cultural dimensions, etc.) societies. Integral parts of the empire in particular are: 1) rigid centralization and hierarchy established through both the political and administrative, law enforcement and through socio-cultural mechanisms; 2)

The mechanisms of establishing imperial influence vary within the spectrum from a direct capture (in this meaning it is said as of a territorial empire) and indirect control by a government (in this case we speak of a hegemonic empire) to less visible, observable, relief forms of imperial influence, such as cultural hegemony. The main dimensions of imperial legacy are — the institutional, material, cultural dimensions, and measurement of the mass consciousness. In the mass consciousness, the imperial experience exists as a social experience on the so-called "order of magnitude" of hierarchies of socio-political loyalties and identities (Fuchs, 2001).

The effects of the post-imperial state of mass consciousness can be: authoritarianism, focus on the importance of the state and nation, loyalty to the state and institutions of coercion and control, the importance of national identity and a sense of superiority (characteristic for a post-metropolis), and strong local identity (typical for the province, particularly located on the "turn" of the empire). Manifestations of imperial heritage depend on many factors. These include the type of the former empire, the level of modernization (secularization and liberalization) and the status in the territory of the former empire (center, periphery, metropolis, satellite). In relation to the mass consciousness and nature of sociocultural phenomena, the post-imperial dependence can be taken as proof of a wide range of cultural reconstituted mass indoctrination mechanisms (of which in the first place are occupied by the media, popular culture and the education system). These are the structures of consciousness, perception and action that organize social reality around imperial meanings (imperial historic and philosophical representations and representations of the "friends" and "strangers" on the content of the reference identity, the terms of which solidarity and trust is a characteristic). Along with specific bureaucratic and political mechanisms of functioning and recreating the empire purposefully, and so to speak synergistically, the sociocultural reproduction of an "imperial man" occurs.

Similar differentiation tactics are used to mobilize imperial patriotism and to reject the idea of the state sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine by masses, a common historical destiny of the Ukrainian population. In the case of Ukraine, the relative prospects of reanimation of the imperial project are due to several reasons. Objective pluralism of the Ukrainian society, the period of decline of the weakening of the "metropolis", and high loyalty of large masses of the population and the political elites to the projects of recreating the empire, which is the specific socio-

asymmetric patterns of treatment resources with which the structure of the Empire is recreated: relatively prosperous, innovative and dynamic center (which is the Metropolis itself — the central city of the empire); less intense and dynamic, delivering valuable resources from the semi-periphery to the center; and depleted by the center and semi-periphery periphery.

cultural umbilical cord linking the "orphaned" population of the empire with the wreckage of the metropolis. In both cases, for the masses and the elites, it should not be ignored that it is not just about the intangible psychological "umbilical cord of cultural dependence" because the elite of post-Soviet republics might consist of "imperial people". Similarly, the differentiation tactics are used in Ukraine to mobilize the imperial patriotism, rejection by masses of the idea of state sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Ukraine, a common historical destiny of the Ukrainian population.

Ukraine is still undergoing economic transformation that is accompanied by high unemployment, slow economic development and high inflation. The economic development of the country is hampered particularly by political environment and situation of dependency on Russian energy sources, struggles for power, as well as the recent military conflict in the Eastern Ukraine. Moreover, it is notable that the bulk of heavy industry (e.g. coal, steel, chemicals, engineering, etc.) is located in the Eastern Ukraine, in poorly performing, unreformed, and Soviet-type enterprises.

Currently, more than 10% of Ukrainian population (1/5 of working age population) resides abroad, typically on a temporary basis (Strielkowski & Weyskrabova, 2014). According to Siar (2008), 15.7 % of households have at least one or more members with experience of working abroad. Most often, Ukrainians are engaged in secondary labor market and usually they do not constitute competitive counterparts to local workers (Markov *et al.*, 2009). They usually work in the building and construction sector, or in housekeeping and agricultural industry (Čermáková & Nekorjak, 2009).

Thence, understanding the concept of "post-colonial cultural dependence" and modern processes in the Ukrainian society in terms of the post-colonial situation, we will consider the following important concepts of this study. Scientific discourse about "imaginary geography" is associated with the works of Said (1978) and Gregory (1994). The concept of imaginary geography concerns representations of the characteristics of places, regions, countries and people living there. Imagination is a mixture of political, media and popular discourses, mythologies, prejudices to people and places (Timmerman, 2008). Nevertheless, imaginary geography is a cultural structure with quite tangible, material consequences. It follows that in the context of this article it is important to have representations of potential migrants about the characteristics of the host countries and their population, and the existing economic, social and political opportunities that become available after migration (Gregory, 1994). The concept of imaginary geography in connection with the migration situation in the expectations of postcolonial cultural dependence has been hardly explored.

Therefore, migration stands for a complex socio-economically, politically and culturally determined phenomenon, multifaceted by its consequences process that is defined by a set of preconditions and is manifested in sometimes many unexpected areas. In recent decades, changes in the geopolitical and economic conjuncture have resulted in changes in the patterns of external migration for many countries, including the Soviet Union and the countries caught up on the borderland of new geopolitical, economic and socio-cultural formations. Aspects of external migration to be considered include the perception of migration as a desired life prospect, which took roots and created socio-cultural traditions and a culture of migration. The perception by potential migrants of host societies as a welcome and comfortable stay and place of work (or vice versa); especially the perception of migrants by the residents of host countries (and vice versa); and new social practices acquired by migrants in host countries, which change the societies to which the migrants return. When talking about cultural characteristics that define migration desires, we mean representations, attitudes and assessments produced by the respondents that are relevant to the issue of migration behavior.

Despite the fact that migration flows in the modern world have been numerous basic subjects of postcolonial studies during recent decades, migration flows were directed from the global South (colonized in the past) to the direction of global North (colonialist in the past). Of course, such a choice is justified as a research object, and it is fully consistent with the distribution of inequality, poverty and other social problems of the modern world. Since the end of the 1980s, along with the collapse of the socialist block, a system of paternalistic employment has disappeared, and the demand for labor significantly has decreased together with incomplete and informal employment. The critical question is to explain why Ukraine failed so badly, with a bad environment for new firms and limited job creation. These circumstances and instability in labor relations, the growing threat of poverty in the aftermath of job loss and labor income caused a wave of spontaneous mass labor reallocation between enterprises of different ownership forms and spheres of economic employment, and intensified the process of external migration. As a result, one of the largest migration flows to the EU was formed, thus giving bases to some researchers speaking about Ukraine as a "Europe's Mexico" (Düvell, 2006). Unlike the neighboring countries of Eastern and Central Europe (such as Poland, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) for which this period was also characterized by intensive international migration (Simionescu *et al.*, 2017; Koisova *et al.*, 2018), Ukraine does not demonstrate significant progress in the devel-

opment of the national economy and the labor market, painfully overcoming the consequences of the global financial economic crisis.

Data and methods

Data are drawn from the database of the EUMAGINE project³. The data collection was conducted in the countries that are powerful suppliers of migration flows into the EU countries (Morocco, Senegal and Turkey and Ukraine). Note that the purpose of the study (i.e. the relationship between migration expectations and post-colonial cultural residues) is relevant to three of the four countries (Morocco, Senegal and Ukraine) participating in the study. According to the chosen methodology, which is a synthesis of neo-institutionalism and social constructivism, a migration environment is extremely important in decision-making. This emigration environment consists of the social, cultural, political and economic context on the one hand, as well as the nature of migration as a socially and culturally constructed project on the other hand.

The latter refers to the discursively constructed meanings of migration. This characterizes the second element of the methodology — the element of social constructivism. This article hypothesizes that macro and meso level discourses in the emigration environment influence aspirations indirectly through perceptions of “migratory imaginations” and “geographical imaginations” and this influence can be positive and / or negative. In our conceptual model, we hypothesize perceptions of migratory and geographical imaginations to play a crucial role in shaping migratory aspirations. The concept of “perceptions” and “geographical imaginations” remains relatively unearthed in migration literature. Moreover, the relationships between postcolonial cultural heritage and migration expectations of the population of Ukraine also remain unexplored.

Four regions were selected in Ukraine, all of them were the districts that met the criteria for a kind of “theoretical sampling”: Solomensky district of Kyiv (the area with the highest positive net migration within the country), Zbarazhsky district of Ternopil region (the area with the highest rate of

³ Project “EUMAGINE: Imagining Europe from the outside” was conducted by a consortium of universities and research centers (University of Antwerp (Belgium), University of Oxford (UK), Research Institute for Peace (Norway), University of Koç (Turkey), University of Mohamed V (Morocco), Centre for Sociological Research (Ukraine), University Cheikh Anta Diop (Senegal) during the period of February 2010 to January 2013 in four countries. As part of the study, 2000 respondents were randomly interviewed in each country using the questionnaire. Project Number: SSH-2009-4.2.2.

external migration) Znamyansky district of Kirovograd region (the area with low external migration) and Novovodolazsky district Kharkov region (the area with the highest rate of external migration). Thus four of the five macro regions of Ukraine have been covered except those including Donbass and the Crimea. Mean values were used to construct the integrated indices.

Results

In accordance with the above division of macro-regions of Ukraine, Znamyansky and Novovodolazsky districts belong to the same part of the "gradient" of the mass consciousness of the population, which is hypothetically characterized by postcolonial cultural dependence on the former imperial center of the Russian Empire as a characteristic of mass consciousness of people in the region. For example, the close distance between the Kharkiv region and the Russian Federation, transport and geographical conditions, economic conditions, as well as a quite liberal border-crossing regime contribute to almost complete orientation of external migration from the Kharkivsky region to the direction of Russia⁴. The second representative of this macro-region is Znamyansky district of Kirovograd region: on the background of low levels of external migration, internal migration is strongly manifested, particularly to Kiev.

In the mass consciousness of Zbarazh and Solomensky districts' citizens the postcolonial dependency syndrome may hypothetically have a stronger presence concerning the inclusion into the Austrian and latter Hungarian Empire (from 1772–1918) and I and II Rzeczpospolita e.g. the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1795) and Second Polish Republic (1918–1939). Solomyansky district of Kiyv has a high positive net migration — the population is growing thanks to the Ukrainian capital, primarily through internal migration (91.7%). Traditional migration flows from Zbarazh district of Ternopil region in the common West Ukrainian patterns are directed to neighboring European countries.

Substantial polarization is shown by the question concerning the desired directions of external migration. First, the very desire to migrate abroad (under ideal favorable conditions) was expressed by 48.8% of respondents from the central and western Ukrainian regions, and 42.4% of respondents from the eastern and southern regions (The question was: "ideally, if you

⁴ Note that the visa-free crossing of the Ukrainian-Russian border de-facto was tightened only after the events of the first quarter of 2014, when many "political tourists" from Russia were seen in the mass protest actions destabilizing south-eastern regions of Ukraine.

had the opportunity, would you like to go abroad to live or work?”). For the Southeast of Ukraine, the most desirable direction of external migration is Germany (19.1%), while the Russian Federation occupies the second place with 17.9%. At the same time, in the western Ukrainian region only about 3% chose the Russian direction, and in the European Union the most popular destinations were Italy and Germany⁵. In the analyzed central and western Ukrainian regions, the Euro-Atlantic direction of migration is significantly more represented (direction of the U.S. and Canada together — 28.7%) and the Russian direction is marginal. At the same time, for the south-eastern region the European direction of migration is co-present with the Russian direction and at the same time, the Atlantic direction is not significant. The desired destinations of foreign migration of Ukrainian citizens according to the regions of their living are presented in Table 1.

Research tools contained a series of questions designed to identify the characteristics of the "imaginary Europe" in the perception of Ukrainian respondents living in different areas (and in different habitats according to the criteria of post-imperial influence) used series of isolated and analytically integrated indicators. In Table 2, there are questions used to construct the integral indicators: evaluation indices of the country and Europe, as well as migration index of expectations (from migration to Europe).

Integrity and validity of the integration index supports the thesis that migratory expectations should be regarded as a coherent structure of respondent consciousness, quite logically embedded into her or his worldview, and therefore can become the subject of the scientific analysis and incorporated into the context of wider theoretical considerations. Index values of assessment of the country by Ukrainian respondents regarding the region of residence are computed in Table 3.

An indicator to assess the respondents did not record the country's inter-regional differences: an extremely critical attitude toward the effectiveness of public institutions in Ukraine is fully manifested in all the investigated socio-cultural contexts. In matters related to the effectiveness of education and healthcare, it can be seen that the majority of respondents, regardless of their residence, agree that in Ukraine these systems do not work well. Similarly, on the issue of corruption in Ukraine, the "strongly agree" response dominated (note that Ukraine itself is widely understood to be a highly corrupted country, which means moving almost anywhere would be an improvement).

⁵ Poland as a desirable direction of migration is not among the leaders, despite the fact that it offers the most favorable migration regime for Ukrainians among all the EU countries.

The assertion that "politics in Ukraine are doing what is best for the people" gained little support. More than 70% of respondents partially or totally disagreed with the statement, while 20% were undecided. The high level of confidence, alienation from government and formal institutions long before the events of winter-spring 2013–2014 pointed to processes of delegitimizing government and even allowed for the revelation of regional peculiarities of de-legitimization: in Ternopil region 90% were recorded to be critical-minded towards politicians. As in the previous responses, correlation with migration plans of respondents is fixed. Thus, quantitative assessment demonstrates a complete picture of the state of mass consciousness in a negative assessment of the effectiveness of the institutional system of the country. When the responses in the regional dimension are analyzed, it becomes apparent that in Kharkiv and Kirovograd regions there is a substantially higher percentage of undecided respondents (well higher than in Kyiv and Ternopil regions and in Znamenskiy district), showing the uncertainty and disorientation of a large part of the population and a drifting nature of the mass consciousness.

Index values assessment of Europe by Ukrainian respondents according to the region of residence is presented in Table 4.

The effect of the respondents' region of residence was revealed: evaluation of European countries by the respondents from the Central and Western region of Ukraine at a statistically significant level is above the corresponding estimate of the respondents of southeastern region. As expected, there was a fixed direct correlation between the assessment of European countries and the desire to migrate, such as a fixed correlation between the acceptance of the fact that "there is a lot of corruption in Europe" and reluctance to migrate. As shown below, an important predictor of migration expectations is, as described above, the assessment of the country and European countries with regard to institutional effectiveness and presumably is related to the quality of life and region of residence of the respondent. Index values of migration expectations of Ukrainian respondents by region of residence are computed in Table 5.

Similarly, the index value of migration expectations is distributed. The indicator for the Central and Western Ukraine was significantly higher than the corresponding figure for the Southeastern Ukraine. An imaginary geography in the minds of respondents was revealed through a series of questions that were indirectly related to migration and expectations. The question of the degree of agreement with the statement "Ukrainians, who live in Europe are treated badly" captures a significant dispersion of responses; 34% of the respondents agree with the statement that migrants from Ukraine are poorly accepted in Europe, 30% of respondents disagreed.

Such a distribution, not least due to regional differences is formed in relation to the allegations of discrimination. As the analysis of the regional distribution shows, the highest conviction in the fact that Ukrainians are poorly treated in Europe is in the central-eastern region of Ukraine in Novovolodolazsk district of Kharkiv region, and is 45.2% (the percentage of respondents of the region who disagree with the statement is 28,6%). The highest rate of agreement with the statement was recorded among female respondents from Kharkiv region without migration intentions (42.2%), which may indicate the presence of a massive operation discourse on Ukrainian women in Europe.

At the same time, the lowest conviction that Ukrainians are poorly treated in Europe is recorded in the western region of Ukraine in Zbarazh district of Ternopil region and is 28.7% (vs. 30.7% disagreed with this statement). Paradoxically, in the Zbarazh district 8.8% of the respondents received a visa to travel to Europe for the past five years, while in Novovolodolazsk district (most convinced in discrimination of Ukrainians in European countries) only 1.4% had had a visa to European countries over the past five years. The most confident bad attitude of Europeans towards the Ukrainians was the respondents in those regions that have little experience of traveling to Europe. Here we are dealing with an imaginary geography in its pure form. We can conclude that the characteristic of mass discourse of the Ukrainian society of external migration is a negative stereotyping of this phenomenon, particularly in the aspect of discrimination of Ukrainians in Europe. We assume that the media mostly construct this negative discrimination, because such beliefs are mainly subject to those who have personally never been abroad. The media following sensational materials, often involving death and suffering of Ukrainian migrants abroad play a significant role in this phenomenon. As a hypothesis, the influence of Russian media with anti-European rhetoric for the last few years should be considered.

A number of questions have revealed the gender dimension of imaginary geography and migration expectations (this is the statement "a woman in Ukraine [Europe] has the same opportunities in life as man" and "woman lives in Ukraine [Europe] is ... [good, tolerable, bad, or very bad]"). Over 40% of respondents agreed that women in Ukraine have the same opportunities in life as men (it is interesting that in all regions a higher rate of affirmative responses was recorded among male respondents). Almost half (45%) of respondents said that a woman's life in Ukraine was "neither good nor bad", and about 36% chose the alternative "life is bad" or "very bad", while the opposing alternatives scored only 17.4%. The indicator of negative perceptions of a woman's life in Ukraine is significantly higher in the

eastern region: in the Kharkiv region it is about 62%, while in Kiev it is only 44%. From our perspective, there is a reason to speak of a system of socio-cultural predictors of migration expectations and, accordingly, the migration behavior. Some of these predictors allow hypothetically (until further verification in future studies) to identify data (see Table 6). Correlation indices of assessment of the country, Europe and migration expectations with migration intentions of Ukrainian respondents by the region of residence are presented in Table 6.

Discussion

The structure of the global economy proved to be the key factor of international migration, not the differences in salaries or gaps in employment structure, like Massey *et al.* (1993) previously indicated. As Kandrychyn (2008) previously noticed, the explanatory power is reflected by historic border. These borders are important when sociocultural differences and political barriers overlap. In this context, the largest gap between societies are attributed to those with different civilizational areas. This idea previously described by Huntington, has many followers, but also people who criticize it. In the case of Ukraine, this country belongs to “torn societies”, which present borders between different cultural and civilizational areas.

The aspects analyzed in this article (in particular, the imaginary geography) have revealed differences in migration expectations and the imaginary geography of respondents. The result is consistent with previous studies of Bilan (2012) and Carling and Schewel (2018). Bilan (2014, 2017) suggested the significant impact of economic, socio-demographic, socio-cultural, and structural factors on migratory mood in Ukraine. Carling and Schewel (2018) suggested the existence of two-step approaches as a class of analytical frameworks that describe the primary rationality of the aspiration model. The harmonization between methodological and empirical background suggests new directions of research on global migration in various forms.

In accordance with the post-imperial discourse, depending on the problems of development of the former colonial territories (especially peripheral), the deeper and the more relevant connection was with the former metropolis. In particular, the higher the intensity of the process of external migration towards the metropolis the more powerful the processes of recreating underdevelopment. In this sense, the eastern vector of external migration (is directed primarily to the “mother city” — Moscow) not only contributes to the end of crisis in the Ukrainian society, but also recreates it, at

least in the social and cultural sense — through the problematization of the formation of a new Ukrainian solidarity and identity.

In the case of Ukraine's Eastern vector of external migration (which is directed primarily to the "mother city" — Moscow), it not only contributes to the exit of Ukrainian society from the crisis but also recreates it, at least in social and cultural sense — the formation of a new Ukrainian solidarity and identity is problematized. This formalization is not about the enduring dependence on the former point within the post-Soviet space and dependence of the newly acquired Central European countries on the European Union. Although in the latter case there is the formation of new structures of authority, a new metropolis (because the Poles or Western-Ukrainians rarely migrate to work in Vienna, the former capital of the Austro-Hungarian Empire), greater decentralization, full-featured democracy and market-based mechanisms of a competitive free market. Therefore, we have found a correlation between the expectations and perceptions of migration of Ukrainians on the one hand and post-imperial cultural population dependencies of different historical and cultural macro-regions of Ukraine, on the other. This result was previously obtained by Jaroszewicz (2015). Such a feature of the mass consciousness of the population of modern Ukraine fits into the overall picture of the socio-cultural differences on the "post-imperial borderland" and resonates with the current political split in Ukrainian society.

Conclusions

This study has indicated a strong correlation between migration expectations and perceptions of Ukrainians and post-Soviet cultural dependencies. Ukraine represents a "post-imperial borderland", which results in the political split of its society. These results could contribute to the construction of links between the imaginary geography of the Central, Western, and South-eastern regions of Ukraine and migration expectations and orientations. In this context, the potential social reforms should provide support to people who intend to migrate to clearly understand what the consequences of their decisions might be. There are positive stereotypes about Europe, and the regional factor is significant in this case, because residents of Western and Central Ukraine perceive European countries in a more positive way than non-EU countries.

The limits of the research are given by the analysis on a particular sample, generalizations not being made for the entire population. In future research, a representative sample of respondents will be selected to ensure the

consistence of the results for the Ukrainian population. Moreover, the correlation between European institutions and geographical imaginations of the Ukrainians regarding institutional efficiency in the origin country.

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Annex

Table 1. Desired destinations of foreign migration of Ukrainian citizens (according to the regions of their living)

Macro-regions of Ukraine	Desired country of migration (% , N)
South-East (N=424)	Germany 19.1 (81)
	Russian Federation 17.9 (76)
	Italy 12.0 (51)
	France 7.3 (31)
	Great Britain 7.1 (30)
Central and Western (N=488)	USA 5.2 (22)
	USA 21.5 (105)
	Italy 15.0 (73)
	Germany 12.9 (63)
	Great Britain 10.0 (49)
Other destinations (N=1088)	Canada 7.2 (35)
	-

Source: own calculation based on EUImagine project data.

Table 2. Components of integrated indicators and their integrity

Integrated indicators	Questions included in the integrated index of migration expectations	Degree of integrity of the integrated index (α -Cronbach)		
		Indicator for Ukraine	Indicator for the central-western Ukraine	Indicator for the south-eastern Ukraine
Index of migration expectations	When a woman goes to live or work in Europe, then it could be a good experience for her; When a man goes to live or work in Europe, then it could be a good experience for him; Most Ukrainians who have left to live or work in Europe became rich; Most Ukrainians who have left to live or work in Europe received valuable skills.*	0.72	0.654	0.764

Table 2. Continued

Integrated indicators	Questions included in the integrated index of migration expectations	Degree of integrity of the integrated index (α -Cronbach)		
		Indicator for Ukraine	Indicator for the central-western Ukraine	Indicator for the south-eastern Ukraine
Evaluation index of the country	The quality of life of a man in Ukraine; The quality of life of a woman in Ukraine; Schools in Ukraine; Medical care in Ukraine; Supporting the poor by the state in Ukraine.**	0.72	0.654	0.764
Evaluation index in Europe	The quality of life of a woman in Europe; The quality of life of a man in Europe; Schools in Europe; Medical care in Europe; Supporting the poor by the state in Europe.**	0.72	0.654	0.764

Notes: *) Responses are on a scale of "1" to "5" where "1" means "Strongly agree" and "5" means "Fully disagree". **) Responses are on a scale of "1" to "5" where "1" means "very bad", and "5" means "very good."

Source: own calculation based on EUmanage project data.

Table 3. Index value of assessment of the country by Ukrainian respondents (regarding the region of residence)

Integrated index value	The significance of differences between mean values	
The average for Ukraine	2.51	
Indicator for the Central and Western Ukraine	2.54	ns
Indicator for the South-Eastern Ukraine	2.48	

Notes: While creating an index integrating migration expectations, we relied on the guidelines and methods for verifying the reliability indices presented in the works of Holovakha, Gorbachik, Panina and Resnick (Holovakha et al 1997) and (Reznik 2007).

** statistical significance at the level of $p < 0.01$; * statistical significance at the level of $p < 0.05$

Source: own calculation based on EUmanage project data.

Table 4. Index value assessment of Europe by Ukrainian respondents (according to the region of residence)

Integrated index value	The significance of differences between mean values	
The average for Ukraine	3.81	
Indicator for the Central and Western Ukraine	3.9	0.000**
Figure for the South-East Ukraine	3.73	

Note: We relied on the guidelines and methods for verifying the reliability indices presented in the works of Holovakha, Gorbachik, Panina and Resnick (Golovakha et al., 1997) and (Reznik 2007).

Source: own calculation based on EUmanage project data.

Table 5. Index value of migration expectations of Ukrainian respondents by region of residence

Value	Index of migration expectations		
The average for Ukraine	2.64		
Integrated index value and significance difference between the average values	Indicator for the Central and Western Ukraine	2.53	0.000**
	Indicator for the South-East Ukraine	2.74	

Note: We relied on the guidelines and methods for verifying the reliability indices presented in the works of Holovakha, Gorbachik, Panina and Resnick (Golovakha et al., 1997) and (Reznik 2007).

Source: own calculation based on EUmanage project data.


Table 6. Correlation indices of assessment of the country, Europe and migration expectations with migration intentions of Ukrainian respondents by region of residence

Value		Index of migration expectations	Evaluation index of the country	Evaluation Index of the European countries
Correlation factor with the answer to the question "Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you have gone abroad to live or work next five years or would have remained in your country?"	For Ukraine	-.303**	-.251**	.161**
	Indicator for the Central and Western Ukraine	-.249(**)	-.268(**)	.081(*)
	Indicator for the South-East Ukraine	-.339(**)	-.243(**)	.211(**)

Note: We relied on the guidelines and methods for verifying the reliability indices presented in the works of Holovakha, Gorbachik, Panina and Resnick (Golovakha et al., 1997) and (Reznik 2007).

Source: own calculation based on EUmagine project data.

Figure 1. East and West Ukraine: cultural opposition and contradictions of social expectations



Note: * Russian – 3,1 %. **Surzhyk (mix) - 2,5%. ***Ukrainian – 94,4%.

Source: All-Ukrainian survey of Ukrainian population conducted for “Hromadska varta” supported by “Ilko Kucheriv Democratic initiatives” Fund and held on 16-30 March 2014 with a sample of 2.010 respondents in 24 regions, including Crimea and Kiev.